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Abstract 
This paper focused on the Darfur issue and discussed the reasons behind the repeated failure to achieve 
sustainable peace despite the many agreements, declarations of principles and platforms.The paper touched on 
the historical background of the agreements signed between the government and the armed movements, and the 
movements that splintered from the main movements, where the result has always been the collapse of the 
agreements.The historical approach is followed in this paper, as the most appropriate for this type of research 
work. The paper also adopted the questionnaire as a means of obtaining the initial information directly from the 
research community.The results of the analysis and their indicators were discussed, coupled with the historical 
background of the conflicts in Darfur and the reasons for the failure of previous agreements.The researcher has 
come up with a set of initial perceptions, through which a public debate on the Darfur crisis and the prospects for 
a sustainable solution can be initiated in a way that avoids repetition of past experiences, which have adopted 
traditional solutions, despite its inability to put an end to chronic historical tribal conflicts in Darfur. 
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Definition of main concepts 
The Janjaweed: 
The Janjaweed are a militia that operate in western Sudan and eastern Chad. Using the United Nations 
definition, ( the Janjaweed comprised Sudanese Arab tribes, the core of whom are from the Abbala background 
with significant recruitment from the Baggara people) (1) 
 
Hakoura: 
Hakoura is an area of land, given to a tribe, which borders its neighbors from other tribes. Within Hakoura, there 
is land given to minority tribes, under the supervision of the main tribe in Hakoura. The leader of the tribe is the 
organizer of the farms, pastures and water bodies, and has the power to grant and prevent. There are powers, for 
minority tribal leaders, to avoid friction between farmers and herders. ”(2) 
Hakoura is an Arabic word, compiled by Hawakir, and the word Hakoura in the Fur language is Ro - and 
collected - ROTA. (3) 
 
Sustainable Peace: 
Sustainable peace in this paper, means that, peace provides the right to dignified, safe, stable and easy human 
needs for present generations, without harming the right of future generations to enjoy the same benefits at the 
same level or better. 
  
Introduction:  
Darfur has a specificity based on historical and geographical data as well as the social and cultural environment. 
Darfur has been an independent state for more than 500 years in the name of the Sultanate of Darfur, and its 
rulers were from the Fur tribe, so the Sultanate took the name of Darfur, the largest tribes in the region. Sultan 
Ali Dinar, the last ruler of the Sultanate of Darfur, tried to resist British colonialism and fought several battles 
against the British army. Darfur is home to more than 60 tribal group who speak more than 80 local languages 
and dialects and are a diverse mix of Arab and African tribes. They are extremely intolerant of race and tribe and 
are the most ethnically cohesive in Sudan. This has been reflected in the many tribal conflicts and their ongoing 
resolution projects, which have been transformed into tools and systems supported by deep-rooted customs and 
traditions, derived from positive cultural and social cohesion, leading to the prevalence of Islamic and local 
values, customs and traditions, which have always been a true reference for behavior, conflict resolution and 
discipline at the individual and community level. . These traditions and customs are guarded by powerful tribal 
 
1 http://www.allafrica.com/integrated regional information/2004  
2Noam Choucair: Geography and History of Sudan, Part I, Beirut, 1967, p. 472. 
3    Dr. M. Al-Sharif: Land Ownership and Governance in Darfur, Paper presented to the Peace building Workshop, Center for Western 
Sudan Studies, Nyala, 2005, p. 6. 
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institutions, represented by tribal elders, mayors, sultans, charities, Hakama, etc…. 
This diversity and social specificity, dominated by tribal character and its institutions, resulted in 
subsequent development ramifications in the course of tribal conflicts and wars. With a regional, political, socio-
economic cover, and despite its local and regional orientation, it has taken on a new, national and even global 
character, in an accelerated and spectacular manner. 
Darfur has become the headline in the widely read and written media, but also one of the most famous cases 
of conflicts in contemporary human history. It has also surpassed the South Sudan War in terms of victims, 
refugees, displaced persons and material and moral losses. The war in Darfur now lasted fifteen years, during 
which more than fifteen agreements were signed, as well as platforms, axes and agenda. 
The unanswered question arises: What are the reasons behind the failure of these agreements to achieve 
peace? 
 
Darfur Population: 
The population of Darfur is approximately 7.5 million, according to the last census in 2008. They use local 
languages as well as Arabic. Darfur is home to a large number of tribes, which are divided into two groups, 
"settled tribal groups" in rural areas such as: "Fur", "Masalit", "Bargou", "Alberti" Zaghawa "," Mararit "," Dajo 
"," Altnjr "" Hausa, Tama, and Al Barqad in addition to the nomadic tribal groups that move from one place to 
another such as: "Abala", "Mahamid", "Mehriya", "Bani Hussein", "Rizeigat", "Ma'ale" and Salamat and Bani 
Halba Most of the settled tribes are African, and speak local languages in addition to Arabic, some of them 
Arabs, while the majority of nomadic tribes are Arabs. 
 
Darfur Economy : 
There are abundant forests of gum in the Darfur region, as well as cotton and tobacco plantations in the 
southwest of the region. Various fruit trees are also growing in the Jebel Marra area, which is characterized by a 
Mediterranean climate, as well as vegetables in the valleys and coves. 
In some areas of Darfur, wheat, maize, millet and others are grown. 
Darfur is characterized by a large animal wealth of camels, sheep and cattle, which was affected when the 
drought hit the region in the early eighties. In addition to animals and agriculture, the region has minerals and 
petroleum.(1 )  
 
 
1 Documents of Al-Fasher conference for resolving Darfur crisis, July 5, 2010. 
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Traditional Areas of Darfur Ethnic Groups(1)  
 
 
Political and Armed Movements in Darfur: 
Before and after Sudan's independence in 1956, political activities in Darfur were carried out by northerners and 
local tribal leaders. 
The harbingers of regional political movements emerged in 1957 with the Red Flames Movement, a 
clandestine movement, aimed at raising the political awareness of the people of Darfur. During the government 
of General Ibrahim Abboud (1957-1964). 
 Later, in 63/1964, the Sony movement was led by soldiers from Darfur, who took part in the war in 
southern Sudan, and returned to Darfur with political awareness. This movement was violently suppressed. 
After the success of the October 1964 revolution, the Rural Union was formed from the following unions: 
the Southern Front, the General Union of the Nuba Mountains, the Union of North and South Anqisna, the Beja 
Union, the Renaissance Kordofan Front and the Renaissance Front of Darfur, with the aim of demanding 
economic development and political independence in the formulation of plans and programs 
 
1 www.geographyabout.com/library/maps/b/sudan07. 
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The Organization of Western Sudan was formed in 77/1979 during the reign of President Nimeiri, under the 
leadership of Captain Jacob Ismail. 
In 1988, the Arab tribes group emerged on the scene, which was the nucleus of the current Janjaweed 
militia, then in 1991, the so-called Bolad Movement, led by the rebel Islamist Daoud Bolad, who joined the 
SPLM, arrived at Jebel Marra, and finally, his movement was violently suppressed by the government. (1) 
The current armed conflict in Darfur started in February 2003, when two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation 
Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), began to declare war on the Sudanese government, 
which is accused of persecuting non-Arab Darfuris. The government responded with massive and very violent 
attacks, which were categorized by several sides as a campaign of ethnic cleansing against non-Arab Darfuris. 
These attacks killed hundreds of thousands of civilians, burned villages and destroyed property, and 
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was accused of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). (2) 
The parties directly involved in the current conflict in Darfur are the SAF, the police and the Janjaweed. 
The Janjaweed are known as Sudanese government-backed militias, made up of Arab pastoral tribes, camel 
herders. Most of the other Arab groups in Darfur remained uninvolved. The other side includes rebel groups, 
especially the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement, which are made up of non-
Arab Muslim ethnic groups such as the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit. 
Although the Sudanese government denies supporting the Janjaweed, there are allegations that it supports 
the militia with financial assistance, weapons, and joint attacks, particularly against civilians.(3) The death toll is 
estimated to be several hundred thousand, either due to fighting or hunger and disease. Massive displacement has 
forced millions of people to go to IDP camps, refugee camps or cross borders, in what has been described as the 
worst humanitarian crisis of our time(4 ).  
Former US Secretary of State Colin Powell called the situation genocide(5 ) . 
There are several different interpretations of the roots of the current conflict. The first interpretation 
supports the notion of land conflict between semi-nomad sheep herders and non-nomadic farmers; the conflict 
over water is also a major cause of conflict. 
On 25 March 2003, the rebels occupied the SAF Tin village camp, near the Chadian border, and seized 
large quantities of ammunition and weapons. (6) 
On April 25, 2003, a joint SLA and JEM force entered El Fasher and attacked an air base at the airport, 
destroying four Antonov bombers and helicopters on the ground, killing 75 soldiers, pilots, technicians, and 32 
prisoners, including an air base commander, a brigade. 
It was a qualitative and successful military operation that did not occur during the 20 years of war in South 
Sudan . 
After the successful of El Fasher military operation, the SAF losses continued, and the government then 
relied on three elements to divert the war to the SAF: 
1. Military Intelligence. 
2. Air forces. 
3. The Janjaweed: become the focus of the government's new counterinsurgency strategy. 
 
1 Sharif Dahab, History of Conflicts in Darfur, Free Pens, JEM Website, April 2018. 
2Issue of arrest warrant for Sudanese President, BBC Arabic, Published March 4, 2009, filed August 8, 2017 . 
3Mahmoud Yusuf, Background to the genocide in Darfur, Darfurna.homestead.com 
4 Gerard Brunner, the Mysterious Darfur Massacres, Hatters & Co. Printing, London, 2005 
5http://www.un.org/news/dh/Sudan/com_Inq_darfur.pdf#search 
6 http://newsbbc.co.uk/hi/arabic/news/newsid_7922000/7922947/stm 
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Map showing the devastation of the rural areas of Darfur during the war (1) 
 
 
The main agreements signed between the Government of Sudan and the armed political opposition 
movements in Darfur: 
The table below summarizes the main agreements signed between the Government of Sudan and the armed 
political opposition movements in Darfur from 2004 to 2011 in various African and Arab capitals. Witnesses to 
these agreements were peace partners from different countries of the world, especially the African neighbors and 
international and continental regional organizations, at various stages of the Darfur crisis. 
The tables show the most important items of these agreements, their outputs and the reasons for their failure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Humanitarian Information Unit, Department of State, 202-203-7789, HIU_INFO@state.gov 
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Reasons for 
success or 
stumbling 
Results  Objectives Place of signature The name of 
the agreement 
Date 
The agreement 
was breached 
by the 
conflicting 
parties 
The 
agreement did 
not hold for a 
long time 
1. Cease-fire 
2. Pass 
humanitarian aid to 
displaced persons 
and refugees 
3 - Open safe 
corridors 
Chadian 
capital (N'Djamena ) 
Protocol on 
humanitarian 
assistance 
2004 
The agreement 
was breached 
by the 
conflicting 
parties and 
accusations of 
non-compliance 
were exchanged 
The 
agreement did 
not hold up 
very much 
1. Cease-fire 
2 - Open safe 
corridors 
3. Deployment of 
observers 
Ethiopian 
capital (Addis 
Ababa) 
Agreement 
for the 
Establishment 
of the 
Ceasefire 
Commission 
between the 
Sudan 
Liberation 
Movement 
and the 
Government 
 ً◌ 
2004 
Great 
cooperation by 
the 
international 
community and 
donors 
The situation 
is much 
improved in 
the camps 
1. Allow the 
distribution of 
humanitarian relief 
2. Provision of 
health services and 
water services 
3. Environmental 
sanitation 
4. Attention to and 
protection of the 
environment 
5. Strengthening the 
security situation 
The Nigerian 
capital ( Abuja  ) 
Protocol to 
improve the 
humanitarian 
situation in 
Darfur 
2004 
The weakness of 
the parties' 
confidence in 
each other and 
the beginning of 
the activity of 
the armed 
movements 
Lack of 
application on 
the ground 
Strengthening the 
security situation 
The Nigerian 
capital( Abuja) 
Protocol on 
security 
arrangements 
in accordance 
with the First 
N'Djamena 
Convention  
2004 
The 
intervention of 
the 
international 
community, the 
prequalification 
of the 
negotiators and 
the guarantee of 
the 
implementation 
of any 
agreement 
reached. 
 
The beginning 
of direct 
negotiations 
between the 
government 
and the 
armed 
movements of 
the Sudan 
Liberation 
Army and the 
Justice and 
Equality 
Movement 
To lay down the 
basic principles that 
can guide the 
negotiators to solve 
the Darfur problem 
Abuja Declaration of 
Principles in 
Abuja  
2005 
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Reasons for 
success or 
stumbling 
Results  Objectives Place of signature The name of 
the agreement 
Date 
1 - rejection of 
the movement 
Abdul Wahid 
and the 
movement of 
Dr. Khalil 
signing the 
agreement 
2. Cluster 
fragmentation 
in armed 
movements. 
3 - the spread of 
tribal militias 
and gangs of 
armed robbery 
4. The great 
presence of the 
international 
and regional 
agenda on the 
scene in Darfur 
and the proxy 
war 
5. Wars in the 
neighboring 
countries of 
Chad and 
Central Africa 
6. Separation of 
Southern Sudan 
7- The negative 
role of 
Darfurian elites 
of all kinds 
8 - Continued 
fragmentation 
in the armed 
movements and 
the beginning of 
the emergence 
of the Arab 
dimension in 
resolving the 
problem of 
Darfur 
9. Lack of trust 
between the 
government and 
armed 
movements 
10 - continued 
fragmentation 
and the 
emergence of 
ambitions 
The 
agreement 
was signed 
with Minni 
Arko Minawi, 
head of the 
Sudan 
Liberation 
Movement 
(SLM). 
Denying the 
signing of the 
agreement: 
Dr. Khalil 
Ibrahim, 
President of 
the Justice 
and Equality 
Movement 
and Abdel 
Wahid 
Mohamed 
Ahmed, head 
of the Sudan 
Liberation 
Army 
Movement. 
And finally 
the collapse of 
the agreement 
after the 
return of 
Minawi to 
take up arms 
Solve the problem of 
Darfur and stop the 
war 
Abuja Darfur Peace 
Agreement 
2006 
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Reasons for 
success or 
stumbling 
Results  Objectives Place of signature The name of 
the agreement 
Date 
personal and 
family in the 
start of 
positions and 
competition for 
positions 
11. 
International 
and regional 
agenda 
12 - the control 
of tribal and 
regional trends 
The continued 
fragmentation 
of armed 
movements and 
the beginning of 
the emergence 
of Arab 
intervention in 
solving the 
problem of 
Darfur 
The 
agreement 
was not 
implemented 
on the ground 
Attaching armed 
movements that 
reject the peace 
process 
The capital of the 
State of Qatar 
(Doha) 
Goodwill 
agreement 
between the 
government 
and the 
Justice and 
Equality 
Movement 
2009 
1. Lack of trust 
between the 
government and 
armed 
movements 
2 - Continuation 
of 
fragmentation. 
3 - The 
emergence of 
greed, personal 
and family 
competition in 
political 
positions. 
3. The 
international 
and regional 
agenda 
4 - a clear 
increase of 
tribal and 
regional 
tendencie 
The 
agreement has 
not been 
complied with 
To bring non-
signatory 
movements to the 
Abuja Agreement to 
the peace process 
The capital of the 
State of Qatar 
(Doha) 
Framework 
Agreement 
between the 
Government 
and the 
Justice and 
Equality 
Movement 
2010 
There is a desire 
on both sides to 
reach 
agreement 
The two sides 
committed 
themselves to 
the agreement 
and to 
continue 
dialogue and 
negotiations 
Attaching armed 
movements that 
refuse to sign the 
peace agreement to 
the peace process 
The capital of the 
State of Qatar 
(Doha) 
The 
Framework 
Agreement 
between the 
Government 
of the Sudan 
and the 
Liberation 
2010 
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Reasons for 
success or 
stumbling 
Results  Objectives Place of signature The name of 
the agreement 
Date 
Movement 
and Justice 
(Tijani Sisi) 
There is a desire 
to reach 
agreement on 
both sides 
The two sides 
committed 
themselves to 
an agreement 
and to 
continue 
negotiations 
Preparing for the 
signing of the Doha 
Document for 
Darfur Peace 
The capital of the 
State of Qatar 
(Doha) 
 
Cease-fire 
agreement 
between the 
Movement for 
Liberation 
and Justice 
and the 
Government 
of the Sudan 
2010 
To push for 
peace by the 
international 
community, 
donors, the 
African Union 
and the United 
Nations, in 
addition to the 
great role 
played by Doha 
in penetrating 
the Darfur 
crisis in order to 
achieve peace. 
1. The 
Convention 
was signed 
with the 
presence and 
guarantee of 
the 
international 
community 
2. Convening 
of the donor 
conference for 
the 
reconstruction 
of Darfur 
3 - The 
regional 
authority for 
Darfur was 
formed under 
the leadership 
of Dr. Tijani 
Sisi 
Achieving peace in 
Darfur 
The capital of the 
State of Qatar 
(Doha) 
 
Doha Peace 
Document in 
Darfur 
2010 
The table is designed by the researcher based on different sources. (1) ,(2),(3),(4),(5)  
 
Methodology: 
From the table above, it is clear that, the vast amount of agreements, declarations of principles and other efforts 
made by mediators from different quarters, all of which have failed to reach an agreement to end the conflict in 
Darfur in a sustainable manner. 
The strategic question is still pending: all these efforts, why did not bear fruit? Despite all these agreements 
and initiatives, why is the conflict still going on? What are the reasons behind the failure of these agreements and 
protocols, which made them unable to achieve peace and stop the war? 
We hope to contribute to the answer through the questionnaire and analysis below: 
 
Population and study sample: 
The study population means the total set of elements through which the researcher seeks to disseminate the 
results related to the problem studied. The original study population consists of all residents of Darfur. 
 
1 Dr. Al - Tijani Mustafa Mohammed Saleh: Causes of Tribal Conflict in Sudan, Paper presented at the seminar (Visions on Tribal Conflicts 
in Sudan), Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum, 1998. 
2 A.Y.Atta, The Mechanism of Armed Tribal Conflicts in South Darfur, Sudanese Writings Magazine, No. 31, March 2005. 
3 Z. El Behairy, Darfur: The Origins of the Crisis and the Implications of the International Criminal Court, Cairo, Al-Nahda Egyptian 
Library, 2008, p. 185. 
4 Voluntary Organizations Working in Sudan, Sudanese Council of Voluntary Societies. 
5 Documents of tribal reconciliation, Ministry of Local Government, Nyala, South Darfur State. 
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The study sample was randomly selected from the study population, where the researcher distributed (200) 
questionnaires to the targeted. 
In order to come up with as accurate results as possible, the researcher was keen on the diversity of the 
sample of the study in terms of including the following: 
Individuals of both sexes 
2 - Individuals of different age groups 
3. Individuals of different academic qualifications 
4. Individuals from different tribes (Fur, Brno, Zaghawa, Tamah, Barqou, Daju, Habbaniyah, Maslamiya, 
Hawara, Masalit, etc.). 
5. Individuals from various professional positions (managers, doctors, human rights activist, political activist, 
teachers, tribal leaders, lawyers, students, farmers, policemen, merchants, others). 
6. Foreign aid workers (20 persons) 
7. IDPs in Kalma camps in South Darfur, Hasahayisa in West Darfur and Abu Shouk in North Darfur (an 
average of 30 IDPs from each camp) 
8. Individuals of different marital status. 
The questionnaire, consisting of one main question and twelve hypothesis, was distributed to the selected 
sample of the study. 
Data and information were emptied in tables prepared by the researcher for this purpose, where the nominal 
variables (strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree) were converted into quantitative variables 
)1, 2 , 3, 4, 5 .(  
The main question: "What do you think are the most important reasons that led to the failure of all the 
agreements that were made to bring peace to Darfur?" 
The Hypothesis # 1: The lack of a clear intellectual and programmatic vision of the political and armed 
opposition, through which to deal with the international community, has further complicated the crisis in 
Darfur and thus the inability to reach a sustainable peace agreement. 
Table (1): Repetitive distribution of the responses of the study sample to the Hypothesis # 1 
 
Source: Researcher preparation from the field study, SPSS program, 2016 
Table (1) shows that (125) individuals in the study sample (63.1%) agree and strongly agree with Hypothesis # 1, 
and 64 individuals (32.4%) disagree and strongly disagree. 
The Hypothesis # 2: The multiplicity of international platforms and their contradictions and conflicts of 
interest and agenda have prolonged the conflict in Darfur. 
Table (2): Repetitive distribution of the responses of the study sample to the Hypothesis # 2 
No Choices # Answers % 
1 Strongly Disagree 27 13.6 
2 Disagree 29 14.6 
3 Neutral 7 3.5 
4 Agree 60 30.3 
5 strongly agree  75 37.9 
6 Total 198 100 
Source: Researcher preparation from the field study, SPSS program, 2016 
Table (2) shows that 135 individuals in the study sample (68.2%) agree and strongly agree with Hypothesis # 2, 
only 56 individuals (28.2%) disagreed and strongly disagreed. 
No Choices # Answers % 
  1 Strongly Disagree 34 17.2 
2 Disagree 30 15.2 
3 neutral 9 4.5 
4 Agree 67 33.8 
5 strongly agree  58 29.3 
6 Total 198 100 
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The Hypothesis # 3: The decline of the concept of national liberation movements in the world, after the 
collapse of the Socialist bloc, put the armed movements in Darfur and their political bodies under the 
influence of various international agenda and interests. 
Table (3): Repetitive distribution of the responses of the study sample to the Hypothesis # 3 
No Choices # Answers % 
1 Strongly Disagree 26 13.1 
2 Disagree 51 25.8 
3 Neutral 17 8.6 
4 Agree 43 21.7 
5 strongly agree  61 30.8 
6 Total 198 100 
Source: Researcher preparation from the field study, SPSS program, 2016 
Table (3) shows that (104) individuals in the study sample, with a percentage (52.5%) agree and strongly agree 
with Hypothesis # 3, and there were (77) individuals with a percentage (38.9%) disagree and strongly disagree. 
The Hypothesis # 4: Globalization, the clash of civilizations and global virtual culture, exacerbated the 
complexities and prolonged the crisis in Darfur. 
 Table (4): Repetitive distribution of the responses of the study sample to the Hypothesis # 4 
No Choices # Answers % 
1 Strongly Disagree 21 10.6 
2 Disagree 14 20.7 
3 neutral 27 13.6 
4 agree 67 33.8 
5 strongly agree  42 21.2 
6 Total 198 100 
Source: Researcher preparation from the field study, SPSS program, 2016 
Table (4) shows that 109 individuals in the study sample (55%) agree and strongly agree with Hypothesis # 4, 
and only 62 (31.3%) disagree and strongly disagree. 
The Hypothesis # 5: The fact that Darfur has become one of the biggest corridors of the drug trade in 
Africa and the Middle East has led drug traffickers to support the prolongation of the conflict in Darfur. 
Table (5): Repetitive distribution of the responses of the study sample to the Hypothesis # 5 
No Choices # Answers % 
1 Strongly Disagree 28 14.1 
2 Disagree 48 24.2 
3 Neutral 13 6.6 
4 Agree 56 28.3 
5 strongly agree  53 26.8 
6 Total 198 100 
Source: Researcher preparation from the field study, SPSS program, 2016 
Table (5) shows that 109 individuals in the study sample (% .155%) agree and strongly agree with Hypothesis # 
5, and there were (76) individuals and percentage (38.3%) disagree, and strongly disagree 
The Hypothesis # 6: Israeli Interests in the Theory of Tightening and Amputation of the Arab World, this 
impedes access to peace in Darfur. 
Table (6): Repetitive distribution of the responses of the study sample to the Hypothesis # 6 
No Choices # Answers % 
1 Strongly Disagree 34 17.2 
2 Disagree 37 18.7 
3 Neutral 16 8.1 
4 Agree 64 32.3 
5 strongly agree  47 23.7 
6 Total 198 100 
Source: Researcher preparation from the field study, SPSS program, 2016 
Table (6) show that 111 individuals in the study sample (56%) approve and strongly agree with Hypothesis # 6. 
Seventy-one individuals (35.9%) disagreed and strongly disagreed. 
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The Hypothesis # 7: The absence of voluntary civil society organizations, Arab, Islamic and national, since 
the beginning of the crisis, Leaving humanitarian action in the hands of foreign organizations has led to 
the feeling that the people of Darfur are alone in this crisis and that, foreigners are closer to them than 
their own people. 
Table (7): Repetitive distribution of the responses of the study sample to the Hypothesis #7 
# No Choices # Answers % 
1 Strongly Disagree 16 8.1 
2 Disagree 18 9.1 
3 Neutral 7 3.5 
4 Agree 53 26.8 
5 strongly agree  104 52.5 
6 Total 198 100 
Source: Researcher preparation from the field study, SPSS program, 2016 
Table (7) shows that (157) respondents in the study sample (79.3%) agree and strongly agree with Hypothesis # 
7, and there were (34) individuals and only (17.2%) disagree and disagree strongly on that. 
Hypothesis # 8: The political and armed opposition does not have a clear perception of the resolution of 
the crisis and left it to the mediators in the various platforms, this led to conflicting agenda of mediators 
and thus failed to reach sustainable solutions for the crisis.  
Table (8): Repetitive distribution of the responses of the study sample to the Hypothesis # 8 
No Choices # Answers % 
1 Strongly Disagree 17 8.6 
2 Disagree 22 11.1 
3 Neutral 7 3.5 
4 Agree 42 21.2 
5 strongly agree  110 55.6 
6 Total 198 100 
Source: Researcher preparation from the field study, SPSS program, 2016 
Table (8) shows that (152) respondents in the study sample (76.8%) agree and strongly agree with Hypothesis # 
8, there were (39) individuals and only (19.7%) disagree and strongly disagree on it. 
Hypothesis # 9: The international struggle for control of the oil and mineral areas and the strategic 
location of Darfur have added complications to the crisis. 
Table (9): Repetitive distribution of the responses of the study sample to the Hypothesis # 9 
No Choices # Answers % 
1 Strongly Disagree 11 5.6 
2 Disagree 12 6.1 
3 Neutral 16 8.1 
4 Agree 53 26.8 
5 strongly agree  106 53.5 
6 Total 198 100 
Source: Researcher preparation from the field study, SPSS program, 2016 
Table (9) shows that (159) respondents in the study sample (80.3%) agree and strongly agree with Hypothesis # 
9, and there were (13) individuals with a percentage (11.7%) disagree and strongly disagree on it. 
Hypothesis # 10: The violations and atrocities committed by the Janjaweed government militia in Darfur 
have shattered social cohesion and raised up the ceiling of peace demands. 
Table (10): Repetitive distribution of the responses of the study sample to the Hypothesis # 10 
No Choices # Answers % 
1 Strongly Disagree 9 4.5 
2 Disagree 13 6.7 
3 Neutral 5 2.5 
4 Agree 39 19.6 
5 strongly agree  132 66.7 
6 Total 198 100 
Source: Researcher preparation from the field study, SPSS program, 2016 
Table (10) shows that (171) respondents in the study sample (86.3%) agree and strongly agree with Hypothesis # 
10, and there were (22) individuals with a percentage (11.2%) disagree and strongly disagree on it. 
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Hypothesis # 11: Land ownership and tribal areas are the central issue in Darfur, the rights of IDPs in 
their land, compensation and evacuation of new settlers from outside Darfur to their countries of origin, 
all prerequisites for the return of IDPs, dismantling of camps and normalization of life. 
Table (11): Repetitive distribution of the responses of the study sample to the Hypothesis # 11 
No Choices # Answers % 
1 Strongly Disagree 8 4 
2 Disagree 11 5.5 
3 Neutral 7 3.5 
4 Agree 50 25.2 
5 strongly agree  122 61.6 
6 Total 198 100 
Source: Researcher preparation from the field study, SPSS program, 2016 
Table (11) shows that (172) respondents in the study sample (86.8%) agree and strongly agree with Hypothesis # 
11, and there were (22) individuals with a percentage (9.5%) disagree and strongly disagree on it. 
Hypothesis # 12: Disbanding all militias without exception, collecting weapons and handing them over to 
government armed forces and security arrangements are necessary conditions for peace in Darfur. 
Table (12): Repetitive distribution of the responses of the study sample to the Hypothesis # 12 
No Choices # Answers % 
1 Strongly Disagree 11 5.5 
2 Disagree 5 2.5 
3 Neutral 2 1 
4 Agree 43 21.7 
5 strongly agree  137 69.2 
6 Total 198 100 
Source: Researcher preparation from the field study, SPSS program, 2016 
Table (12) shows that (180) respondents in the study sample 90.9%) agree and strongly agree with Hypothesis # 
12, and there were (16) individuals with a percentage (8%) disagree and strongly disagree on it. 
 
Discussion 
We can summarize many of the traditional causes of conflict, all over the world, among which are the causes of 
the conflict in Darfur. 
• The conflict over participation in governance includes the participation of minorities and groups in power, 
strategies, rights, etc. 
• Religious and cognitive conflict around the world. 
• Conflicting identities and ethnicities, including race, religion, language and location. 
Other causes include the proliferation of weapons and a culture of violence, which paves the way for 
conflicts, and conflict may also explode as a result of more than one cause at the same time. 
In fact, the issue of the conflict in Darfur is old and has not begun today. We have reviewed its historical 
development, according to recorded history, and avoided the old stories and oral narratives in the period of the 
Sultanate of Darfur, and all the conflicts that we have mentioned, occurred after the annexation of the Sultanate 
of Darfur to Sudan (1916), with its current international geographical borders. 
It is noteworthy that, in most of the discussions of the Darfur crisis, the point that researchers avoid most is 
that when Darfur was annexed to Sudan after the defeat of the Sultan Ali Dinar, Darfur was a sovereign state 
with its political, economic and social system, foreign relations, laws and a sultan army for over five hundred 
years. . 
In fact, the Sultanate of Darfur has been annexed to Sudan, but not integrated into the Sudanese state. It is 
noteworthy that, in most of the discussions of the Darfur crisis, the point that researchers avoid most, is that 
when Darfur was annexed to Sudan after the defeat of Sultan Ali Dinar, Darfur was a sovereign state with its 
political, economic and social system, external relations, laws and a sultan army, for more than five hundred 
years. . 
In fact, the Sultanate of Darfur has been annexed to Sudan, but not integrated into the Sudanese state. 
The Sultanate of Darfur, its systems, institutions and laws were retained, which the British colonization 
benefited in facilitating control and management. 
After the independence of Sudan in 1956, Darfur became part of the state of Sudan, but with a system of 
government controlled by the so-called traditional civil administration and tribes, which have owned their homes 
and Hawakeer since the time of the Sultanate of Darfur, and governed by laws derived from their customs, 
traditions and heritage. 
All this has led to the complexity of the details of the current Darfur crisis, which is not similar to the 
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problems in other peripheral areas in Sudan. 
The Darfur crisis is not an ordinary self-centered crisis; it has gone beyond that, and has resulted in issues 
of national, regional and international dimensions. It is a crowded crisis with conflicting agendas, proxy warfare 
and settlement of accounts, which has nominated it to be the most complex crisis of the era. 
Therefore, traditional solutions do not work in the Darfur crisis, but rather reproduce and prolong the crisis. 
There must be a concerted effort by all sectors of society, including scholars, intellectuals, politicians, 
traditional civil administration, displaced persons in camps, traditional and modern leaders, youth, women, 
leaders of armed movements and tribal elders. 
What is stated above, requires sincere will and desire of the central government to resolve the crisis, by 
touching the roots of the problem transparently, and willingness to meet all its dues, so as, to get out of this 
historic impasse in Darfur, and achieve sustainable peace. 
 
Conclusion 
Based on the historical narrative of the peace agreements that have been held since the outbreak of the Darfur 
conflict in 2003, which took on a regional political and armed nature, and also by drawing on the results of the 
analysis of the questionnaire, we conclude that the crisis in Darfur needs radical treatment, at various levels, and 
the introduction of a phased system. And priorities, in order to obtain sustainable results and how to shape the 
future of governance in Sudan. 
The first essential step is the process of establishing peace, a ceasefire, security arrangements and imposing 
state prestige. 
It is important that the peace documents contain solutions to the problem of land ownership, Hawakir and 
historical rights in this, because it has become the central issue in Darfur. 
It is also important that the peace documents contain the subject of compensation in detail. 
After that, the displaced persons who wish to return to their areas from which they were displaced will be 
provided with housing, health and educational services, clean water and security. 
At the end of this step, all militias will be disbanded or integrated into the SAF as appropriate. 
The second step or phase has a strategic dimension, which relates to the process of positive discrimination 
in Darfur and other underdeveloped areas in Sudan, through national development plans, using the system of 
(Area Specific Plan), according to local needs, in order to be attached to modern civil society in terms of human 
development, service and infrastructure. 
In conclusion, we must always bear in mind that the steadfastness and success of the peace process is based on 
two things: 
The first is that, although there is general agreement among academic researchers on the desired policies 
and applications in post-conflict societies - including economic growth, overall economic structure building, and 
transitional justice - there is little understanding of how the timing and sequence of these policies affect Post-
conflict transition results. 
The second, it is noted that many studies in post-conflict reconstruction tend to study a narrow horizon, 
focusing on policies of political or economic reforms; this underestimates the real complexity of the transition of 
post-conflict societies and keeps doors closed to other aspects. From rebuilding, such as rebuilding social 
relationships and trust, as well as psychological therapies that are always present in those communities. (1) 
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